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APPROPRIATE DEFENSES TO DAMAGE ACTIONS FOR
DISCRIMINATION UNDER SECTIONS 1981 AND 1982
Judicial expansion of the scope of civil rights legislation has raised a
number of questions concerning the liabilities, defenses, and remedies
involved.' In creating rights alone, the statutes left these elements to be
fashioned by the courts. Yet, although defenses to actions brought under
section 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code2 have been explicated
thoroughly by the courts,' the issue of defenses under sections 19811
1. Recent decisions have expanded the scope and application of civil rights legislation
in a number of ways. Probably the most significant breakthrough was Jones v. Alfred
H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), which overturned an established doctrine that
Reconstruction legislation did not apply to private action; see, e.g., Hurd v. Hodge, 334
U.S. 24, 31 (1948); Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 330-31 (1926). See generally
Note, The "New" Thirteenth Amendment: A Prelhiinary Analysis, 82 HAiv. L. Ray.
1294, 1303-06 (1969). Jones held that section 1982 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42
U.S.C. 1982 (1970), prohibited private discrimination in the sale or rental of property.
The Supreme Court has held that sections 1981, 1982 and 1983 of Title 42 of the
United States Code, see notes 2, 4-5 infra, apply to corporations operating community
recreational facilities. Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431 (1973);
Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969). Some lower courts have
gone even further. In McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. granted,
44 U.S.L.W. 3270 (U.S. Nov. 11, 1975) (No. 75-62), section 1981 was held applicable
to private schools, and in Hollander v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 392 F. Supp. 90 (D. Conn.
1975), the court held that section 1981 granted a cause of action to white plaintiffs who
were the subject of racial discrimination.
2. That section provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). All textual references to statutory provisions will be to 42
U.S.C. unless otherwise noted.
3. See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 US. 232 (1974) (defense of immunity of public
officials); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (good faith defense to an action for
illegal arrest); Tenney- v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (defense of immunity of
legislators). See generally Nahmod, Section 1983 and the "Background" of Tort Lia-
bility, 50 IND. L.J. 5, 26-32 (1974).
4. That section provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue,
be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for- the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by
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and 19825 has been given little consideration.' The establishment and as-
cendency of compensatory damages as an appropriate remedy in dis-
crimination cases coupled with the increased popularity of sections 1981
and 1982 as vehicles for antidiscriminatory litigation7 makes a thorough
examination of the question of proper defenses imperative. This Note
will focus on the general problem of defenses in discrimination cases.
An introduction to the problem is provided by Tillman v. Wheaton-
Haven Recreation Association,8 in which the defense of due diligence
was raised by corporate officers in an action for damages for discrimina-
tory acts of the corporation. With Tillman as a starting point, con-
ceptual frameworks upon which liability under civil rights statutes can
be grounded will be developed. These constructs will form a basis for
discussion of defenses, considered primarily in light of the remedies
afforded under each theory.
AN INTRODUCTION OF THE PROBLEM OF DEFENSES:
TILLMAN v. WHEATON-HAVEN RECREATION
AssOCIATION, INC.
The issue of defenses to section 1981 and 1982 actions was discussed
extensively for the first time at the appellate level in Tillman v. Wbea-
white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties,
taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
42 US.C. § 1981 (1970).
5. That section provides:
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State
and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase,
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.
42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970).
6. In Tillman v. Wheatori-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 517 F.2d 1141, 1143-44 (4th Cir.
1975), the court, confronting this issue, apparently was unable to find any precedents
dealing with defenses under sections 1981 and 1982, and therefore rested its analysis
on cases arising under section 1983.
7. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc, 396 U.S. 229 (1969) (sections 1981-82);
Sanders v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 431 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1970) (section 1982); Mizell v.
North Broward Hosp. Dist., 427 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1970) (section 1981). Nothing in the
declaratory language of sections 1981 and 1982 indicates what remedies were contem-
plated. These provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 thus stand in contradistinction
to the Civil Rights Act of 1871, codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), which states that
one violating the Act "shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." Senator Trumbull, who introduced
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, indicated that its objectives included securing freedom
and preventing the deprivation of rights by affording a means for their vindication.
However, he made no mention of compensation. CoNG. GLoB_, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 77
(1865).
8. 517 F2d 1141 (4th Cir. 1975).
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ton-Haven Recreation Association9 (Tillman II); the discussion of lia-
bility and defenses in that opinion initially must be viewed against the
factual and legal background of TilIman 11.
A. Factual Background of Tillman I
Wheaton-Haven Recreation Association was a nonprofit corporation-
operating a swimming pool for use by the members of the association and
their guests.'0 The operation was financed by fees and dues paid by the
members; no one could be admitted unless he or she was a member or
the guest of a member, and the size of the membership was limited. Per-
sons residing within three-quarters of a mile of the pool were given a
preferential place on the waiting list if the membership was full. Persons
residing beyond that limit could not apply for membership except upon
the recommendation of a member, and were not given a preference -on
the waiting list. Further, a preferred member-resident could return his
membership to the association and then confer upon a purchaser of his
property a first option on that membership.
In 1968, a black who had purchased from a nonmember a home with-
in the three-quarter mile radius inquired about membership in the then
all-white pool. Subsequently, the association voted down a resolution
that would have permitted membership of blacks. Further, the board of
directors passed a resolution effectively precluding the admission of black
guests,"' a policy later reaffired by a resolution of the entire member-
9. Id., rev'g 367 F. Supp. 860 (D. Md. 1973). This litigation will be referred to here-
inafter as Tillman 11 to distinguish it from an earlier series of identically styled cases
concerning the applicability of sections 1981 and 1982. See notes 23-24 infra & accom-
panying text.
Defenses involving various immunities have been noted cursorily in several decisions
dismissing claims based on section 1981. See, e.g., Penn v. &hlesinger, 490 F.2d 700
(5th Cir. 1973) (section 1981 does not constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity),
rev'd on other grotmds on rehearing, 497 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam);
Arunga v. Weldon, 469 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1972) (municipal corporation not a "person!
for purposes of section 1981); Rhodes v. Meyer, 334 F.2d 709 (8th Cir. 1964) (tradi-
tional judicial and derivative quasi-judicial immunity applies to section 1981); Howard
v. Rolufs, 338 F. Supp. 697 (ED. Mo. 1972) (state prosecuting attorney acting intra
vires is immune to section 1981 claim); Winterhalter v. Three Rivers Motors Co, 312
F. Supp. 962 (W.D. Pa. 1970) (traditional judicial and derivative quasi-judicial im-
munity applies to section 1981).
10. The factual summary in the accompanying text is derived from the Supreme
Court's opinion in Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 US. 431, 432-34
(1973) (Tillman I).
11. This resolution, limiting guests to relatives of members, was passed the day after a
couple who were members in good standing brought a black guest to the pool It was
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ship.'2 In 1969, the black who was denied membership, a couple who
unsuccessfully sought to bring a black guest to the pool, and the black
guest, instituted a suit against the association and its officers, seeking dam-
ages and injunctive relief under sections 1981, 1982, and Tide II of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.'
B. Legal Background of Tillman II
At the time of the exclusionary measures adopted by the association,
the Supreme Court had handed down only one decision dealing with the
issue of private racial discrimination under sections 1981 and 1982. That
case was Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.;14 a careful look at its holding
and implications is important as it was the only extant guideline for the
association's actions. The Court held that section 1982 barred all racial
discrimination, private as well as public, in the sale or rental of real prop-
erty, but stated explicitly that it did not "deal specifically with discrimi-
nation in the provision of services or facilites in connection with the sale
or rental of a dwelling." '15 From the standpoint of the association, a pro-
vider of services and facilities, Jones fairly could be dismissed as inap-
posite. The Jones reasoning, however, that section 1982 applies to private
discrimination, did support an argument by analogy that section 1981,16
which bars discrimination in the making and enforcing of contracts, like-
wise applies to private discrimination. Nonetheless, any determination of
the scope of section 1981 had to account for the exemption of private
clubs from the operation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.17 A strong
argument could be made that the exemption applied to earlier civil rights
legislation, such as section 1981,11 as well, and that the association fell
admitted that one reason for the adoption of this policy was to prohibit black guests.
Id. at 434.
12. Id.
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000a-6 (1970).
14. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
15. Id. at 413. See note 5 supra for text of section 1982.
16. See note 4 supra for text.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (1970). That section provides: "The provisions of this
subchapter shall not apply to a private club or other establishment not in fact open to
the public .... "
18. Decisions rendered subsequent to the commencement of Tillman I have held
section 1981 subject to the section 2000a(e) exception, see Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven
Recreation Ass'n, 451 F.2d 1211, 1214-15 (4th Cir. 1971); Solomon v. Miami Woman's
Club, 359 F. Supp. 41, 44 (S.D. Fla. 1973); Sims v. Order of United Commercial
Travelers of America, 343 F. Supp. 112, 113-14 (D. Mass. 1972), but the Supreme Court
consistently has declined to reach this issue, finding instead that the establishments
[Vol. 17:571
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within the meaning of a private club under section 2000a(e)."' Thus at
the time of the Tillman suit, there was no precedent supporting the appli-
cability of section 1982, there was a fair implication in Jones that the
section did not apply to the Tillman facts, 20 and there were factors mili-
tating against the pertinence of section 1981.
Given the unsettled character of the law with regard to Wheaton-
Haven Association's situation, the action of the board of directors prior
to the institution of the suit was significant. On two separate occasions
directors sought advice of counsel before refusing to admit blacks as
before it were not in fact private, see Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410
U.S. 431, 438-39 (1973); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 236 (1969).
See also Note, Section 1981 and Private Groups: The Right to Discriminate Versus
Freddom from Discrimination, 84 YALE L.J. 1441 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Private
Groups). Private Groups discusses cases applying the private club exception to section
1981, id. at 1449, and discusses the issue of whether section 2000a(e) partially repeals
section 1981, id. at 1452-55. No conclusion is reached on the latter issue. See generally
6 GA. L. REv. 813 (1972).
19. The factors that would make a club "private' were not delineated clearly at the
time of the Wheaton-Haven Association's discriminatory actions, but a sound prima
facie case could have been made in light of two later Supreme Court decisions, Moose
Lodge No. 197 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), and Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969).
Moose Lodge found a club that conducted its activities on private property, was pri-
vately funded, and admitted only members and guests to its property, to be private
at least within the ordinary meaning of that term. 407 U.S. at 171. The club in Daniel
required only a nominal fee for membership csrds routinely granted to whites and
denied to blacks. The Court determined this to be a mere subterfuge, and held the club
to be a public accommodation. 395 U.S. at 302-08. The Wheaton-Haven Association
system clearly was more similar to the Moose Lodge situation than to Daniel. For dis-
cussions of what constitutes a private club see Note, The Private Club Exemption to
the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A Study in fwzcaial Confusion, 44 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 1112
(1969); Note, Public Accommodations Laws' atl he Private Club, 54 GEo. L.J. 915
(1966); Comment, Public Accommodations: What is a Private Club?, 30 MoNTr. L. Ruv.
47 (1968); Private Groups, supra note 18 at 1442.
20. After the filing of the Tillman I suit in the district court, the legal background
was changed somewhat by the Supreme Court's decision in Sullivan v. Little Hunting
Park, Inc., 396 US. 229 (1969). Little Hunting Park, Inc. was a corporation operating
a community park and playground for residents of the surrounding area. A member-
ship share entitled the persons in the immediate family of the shareholder to use the
park and playground. Shareholders were entitled to assign shares to tenants subject to
board approval. The board refused to approve an assignment by Sullivan to a black
tenant. The Court found the corporation -not to be a private club, and found the
shareholding arrangement to be a right inherent in the lease, making section 1982 ap-
plicable. Finally, the Court held compensatory damages appropriate. Tillman could
be distinguished factually from Sullivan, however, in that the membership in Tillman
was not an assignable interest, was limited numerically as well as geographically, and
was subject to a fairly complex admission procedure.
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members or guests.21 Further, the ratification of the exclusionary policies
by an overwhelming vote of the general membership established the
directors' decision as representative of the corporate body.22
The history of the Tillman litigation is not complex. In an unreported
-opinion the district court granted summary judgment for the defendants.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the
private club exemption of section 2000a(e) controlled sections 1981 and
1982, that the association was a private club, and that acquisition of
membership was not incident to the sale or lease of property, thus mak-
ing section 1982 inapplicable in any event.23 The Supreme Court re-
versed, finding that the benefits afforded by the association were incident
to the property rights involved and that the association was not a private
dub for purposes of section 2000a(e) 24 This series of cases establishing
the unlawfulness of the Association's discrimination constituted Tillman
I; the litigation following remand for determination of damages
constituted Tillman II, in which the district court awarded compensa-
tory damages against the corporation but not against the directors
individually.s Reversing, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
held the directors individually liable, and found their due diligence in
seeking to comply with the law an invalid defense.2
The potential impact of Tillman II hardly can be overemphasized in
light of the rapidly changing nature of civil rights law, and the conse-
quent difficulty in determining when one is in violation of the law. For
example, in McCrary v. Runynon,- decided on the same day as Tillman
II, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that section 1981
prohibited private schools from denying admission to qualified black
applicants solely on the basis of race, overturning years of custom in an
21. Tillman v. Wheaon-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 367 F. Supp. 860, 866 (D. Md.
1973).
22. Id.
23. 451 F.2d 1211 (4th Cir. 1971).
24. 410 U.S. 431 (1973).
25. 367 F. Supp. 860, 866 (D. Md. 1973). The court also initially refused to award
punitive damages or attorney's fees. id. at 864, 866. Later, in an unreported order, it
did allow fees for ACLU staff lawyers, but declined to award fees for other volunteer
lawyers. Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 517 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir. 1975)
(Boreman, J, dissenting).
26. 517 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir. 1975). The appellate court further disagreed with the
lower decision on the question of attorney's fees. Id. at 1147. See note 25 supra.
27. 515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 44 U.SJ.W. 3270 (U.S. Nov. 11,
1975) (No. 75-62).
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area in which it was assumed that discrimination was permissible.2 And
in Hollander v. Sears, Roebuck & Co 9 a white plaintiff was held to have
a cause of action under section 1981 against an employer who discrimi-
nated against white applicants in an effort to recruit blacks. These cases
raise the possibility of extraordinary potential liability. Because defen-
dants now are subject to liability for damages arising from causes of ac-
tion nonexistent only two years ago, the importance of an examination of
the basis of liability under sections 1981 and 1982 is apparent.
Tillman II additionally invoked a body of case law developing lia-
bilities and defenses under section 198330 in situations not generally in-
volving racial discrimination.3' The rationale behind the Tillman exten-
sion and modification of this body of case law to fit section 1981 and
1982 actions,8 and the impact of this approach, also must be discussed.
THREE APPROACHES To LIABILITY UNDER CIVIL
RIGHTS STATUTES PROVIDING No REMEDIES
OR DEFENSES
Because the Reconstruction civil rights statutes (sections 1981-1983)
specify neither remedies nor defenses, courts have resorted to at least
three different approaches to define the scope 9f liability under these
statutes. One approach is based upon the uhderlying piurpose of the acts
as evidenced by legislative history,"' and as elucidated by the Supreme
28. The district court decision, Gonzales v. Fairfax-Brewster School, Inc., 363 F. Supp.
1200 (E.D. Va. 1973), affirmed by McCrary as to the application of section 1981 and
reversed on the issue of attorney's fees, has been the subject of much comment, a
significant portion of which has been negative. See, e.g., Note, Desegregation of Private
Schools: Section 1981 as an Alternative State Action, 62 GEo. LJ. 1363 (1974); Note,-
The Desegregation of Private Schools: Is Section 1981 the Ansmwer?, 48 N.Y.UL. REv.
1147 (1973); Comment, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. Extended to Private Education:
Gonzales v. Fairfax-Breswster School, Inc., 122 U. P.. L. Rav. 471 (1973); 45 Miss. L.J.
246 (1974); 8 U. RicK. L. REv. 285 (1974); 42 U. CQ. L. Rev. 761 (1973); 26 VaND. L.
REv. 1307 (1973). See generally Private Groups, supra note 18.
29. 392 F. Supp. 90 (D. Conn. 1975).
30. For text, see note 2 supra.
31. See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (litigation arising out of Kent
State I ilings); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (petitioners arrested "for "violating"
unconstitutional segregation ordinance); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (unrea-
sonable search and seizure); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (plaintiff sued
legislators for violation of civil rights arising out of legislative investigation); Whirl v.
Kern, 407 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1969) (due to administrative error, plaintiff languished in
jail for nine months after all charges had been dropped).
32. 517 F.2d at 1143-44.
33. A detailed discussion of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 as
19761
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Court.3 4 Another approach has been to use tort law as a construct upon
which to predicate principles of liability. 5 Finally, courts have subjected
the issue of liability to considerations of public policy. 6 These ap-
proaches have not been delineated clearly, and often overlap in the
decisions rendered in this area;3 7 for the purposes of this discussion, they
will be treated separately.
A. The Underlying Purpose Approach
The legislative history of secaons 1981 and 1982, apart from later ex-
plication by the Supreme Court, offers no support for the proposition
that compensatory relief was anticipated as an appropriate means of re-
dress. These sections were enacted to protect the rights of "person and
property" by furnishing means for their vindication, and "to secure free-
dom to all persons within the United States ... . 8 Injunctive relief
would have served these purposes. Although the punitive nature of the
Reconstruction legislation was recognized,39 no deterrent device such
affording a basis for liability under section 1983 is found in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167, 172-83 (1961). See also Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 422-36 (1968).
34. In Tillman 11, for example, the Court reviewed a number of Supreme Court
decisions establishing that common law concepts of immunity were neither enlarged
rior diminished by section 1983, and held these decisions to be persuasive in examining
the question of corporate director liability under sections 1981 and 1982. 517 F.2d at
1143-44.
35. The statement made in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961), that section
1983 should be read against the background of common law tort liability has had a
significant impact on the theory of actions brought under that statute. See Nabmod,
supra note 3 at 6. Tillman 1I extended this concept to section 1981 and 1982 actions.
517 F.2d at 1143-44.
36. See, e.g., Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781, 790-92 (5th Cir. 1969), discussed infra at
note 65 & accompanying text. Whirl examined policy reasons favoring a good-faith
defense to actions under section 1983 for raise arrest and countervailing policy con-
siderations inimical to such a defense in actions for false imprisonment under the same
statute. See also Nahmod, supra note 3, at 15-16.
37. See, e.g., Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 517 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir.
1975); Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781, 789-92; Nahmod, supra note 3 at 15, 28.
38. CoNG. GrBa, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 77 (1865) (remarks of Senator Trumbull). See
also Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MicH. L. REv.
1323, 1327 (1952).
39. Senator Trumbull asserted that "if we believe an act punishing any man who
deprives a colored person of any civil rights on account of his color necessary -if that
is one means to secure his freedom, we have the constitutional right to adopt it." CONG.
Goat, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 322 (1866). He further indicated that such punishment
would deter the deprivation of rights of blacks: "When it comes to be understood in
all parts of the United States that any person who shall deprive another of any right
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as a provision for the recovery of damages was advocated. Yet, in Sulli-
van v. Little Hunting Park, Inc.,4 0 the Supreme Court held that com-
pensatory damages may be sought in an action brought under section
1981. -This broad construction of section 1981 similarly should allow
broad defenses when such relief is at issue. Consistent with this view
and the recognition that Reconstruction legislation was directed toward
eradicating flagrant disregard for the rights of the freedman, - it is doubt-
ful that a good faith, diligent, though misconceived, attempt to comply
with the law should be held invalid as a defense to an action seeking
compensatory relief brought under sections 1981, 1982, or 1983.11 In Till-
or subject him to any punishment in consequence of his color or race will expose him-
self to fine and imprisonment, I think such acts will soon cease." Id. at 475.
40. 396 U.S. 229 (1968).
41. id. at 238-40. A number of earlier Supreme Court cases have established that
compensatory damages are appropriate when federal rights are violated. See, e.g., Bell
v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946) (courts will adjust remedies to grant necessary relief
when federally protected rights have been invaded); Texas & New Orleans R.R. v.
Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 569 (1930) (absence 'of a statutory
penalty is not controlling on the enforceability of the right); Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby,
241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916) (disregard of statute is wrongful act; the right to recover
damages by one thereby injured is implied).
42. J. TENBRoEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 179-81 (1965). See also W. BRocK, AN AmER_-
CAN CRisis 124 (1963); J. MCPHERsoN, THE STRUGGIFOR EQUALITY 332 (1964); K. STAMPP,
Tm ERA OF REcoNnu~rnoN 75 (1965). During the debate on the 1866 civil rights bill
it was noted that:
The Legislature of Louisiana has passed an act by which... any freedman
who makes a contract under it is perfectly at the control and will of the
man with whom he makes the contract. If that man is a bad man, at the
end of the year the freedman will not receive a farthing for his years
labor. He can trump up charges to cheat and defraud the laborer.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess., 340 (1866) (remarks of Senator Wilson).
43. The scope of allowable defenses to a claim for damages was not raised in Sullivan.
Supreme Court decisions upon which the allowance of damages in Sullivan was based
are no more helpful. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946) involved an alleged violation
of fourth and fifth amendment rights, and did no more than establish the general
proposition that compensatory damages might be appropriate.
[WIhere federally protected rights have been invaded, it has been the rule
from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as
to grant the necessary relief. And it is also well settled that where legal
rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right
to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make
good the wrong done.
327 U.S. at 684 (footnotes omitted). The Court did not indicate that such relief was
required in all cases in which a showing of injury was made.
Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916), noted that "[a] disregard of the
command of the statute is a wrongful act, and where it results in damage to one of
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man II, however, the court construed Supreme Court decisions as estab-
lishing that an action brought for "discrimination is fundamentally for
the redress of a tort..." " and held that since the law is directed at the
consequences of discrimination, good faith is not a defense to the fact of
violation. 4
The court cited Griggs v. Duke Power Co.48 for the rule that good
faith is not a defense to a discrimination suit. In that case, Duke Power
Co. made a high school diploma or a satisfactory performance on stand-
ardized intelligence tests prerequisites to certain positions. The lower
courts found no intent to discriminate and held that the presence or ab-
sence of such intent was controlling on the question of violation.4 7 The
Supreme Court reversed on the theory that the statute (Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964) was concerned with discriminatory conse-
quences and that intent was irrelevant to the issue of violation.48
Although Griggs does not control the result of Tillman II because it
speaks to a different statute,49 Griggs also does not control on the issue
the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted, the right to recover the
damages from the party in default is implied . . . ." 241 U.S. at 39. Rigsby, then,
speaks to the "disregard" of a statute, which, suggests that ignorant or intentional vio-
lation of a statute, if accompanied by diligent efforts to comply with the statute, are
not violative of the statute. Thus, when there is a legitimate question as to the scope of
the statute, the implication of a right to compensatory damages is not compelled.
44. 517 F.2d at 1143. See notes 60-63 infra & accompanying text.
45. 517 F.2d at 1143. The court further noted that the 1866 act applied to those who
were unaware of its scope, as well as to those who knowingly violated it. Id.
46. Id., citing 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
47. 401 U.S. at,428.
48. Id. at 432.
49; Indeed, it would seem that section 1983 is more relevant to an interpretation of
sections 1981 and 1982 than Title VII, because historically it is more closely connected.
(Sections 1981 and 1982 originally were enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
and section 1981 was reenacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1870. Section 1983
is part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, which was derived from the Civil Rights Act
of 1866.) And notably, good faith on the part of the defendants has been held to be
relevant in section 1983 cases. For example, in Beauregard v. Wingard, 230 F. Supp.
167 (S.D. Cal. 1964), the complainant alleged that the defendants, police officers, had
arrested and imprisoned him in violation of his rights under the fourteenth amendment
and under section 1983. The court held that motive was relevant, that it "should and
[did] bear heavily in cases under Section 1983 ... ." Id. at 183. In reaching its decision,
the court found support in the language of a number of cases interpreting section 1983,
e.g., United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941) (misuse of power by a "wrong-
doer" as action taken "under color of" state law); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172
(1961) (section 1983 directed against "abuse" of position). Absent some clear indication
from Congress or the Supreme Court that concepts developed under the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and section 1983 are to be applied to sections 1981 and 1982, it cannot
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6f defenses to actions for damages under sections 1981 and 1982 because
damages were not sought in that case. Although good faith and proper
intent do not obviate the justification for injunctive relief, it does not
follow that they are irrelevant to the rationale underlying compensa-
tory damages. Furthermore, the language in Griggs is consistent with
the restriction of allowable remedies to injunctive relief only. Griggs
states the purpose of Tide VII to be the removal of barriers creating dis-
criminatory preferences in employment.50 Damages are not necessary to
effect this purpose; the affording of injunctive relief is sufficient.
Further, in finding discrimination unlawful regardless of intent, 1 the
Court in Griggs addressed itself exclusively to the context of employ-
ment discrimination. In the social milieu, not all discrimination is pro-
hibited. '2 Thus, Griggs does not preclude necessarily the consideration
of intent in this context when a bona fide belief in the lawful nature of
the discrimination is professed.
In addition to its reliance upon Griggs, the court in Tillman II relied
upon Cooper v. Aaron8 and Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co."4 in de-
termining that good faith could not be a defense to a discrimination suit.
Neither of these cases seems entirely appropriate, however. Cooper in-
volved an application by the Little Rock, Arkansas, School Board to the
federal district court to suspend the implementation of its approved de-
segregation plan because of anticipated violence and disruption such
as had occurred during the previous year. The Supreme Court ordered
reinstatement of the plan. Accepting "without reservation" the good
faith of the school board,55 the Court nonetheless found the disruption
to have been the result of state governmental interference, and con-
cluded that this fact compelled the rejection of the board's position.'
Whether the board's good faith would have been sufficient to have war-
ranted the suspension of desegregation absent other state interference
was left open. In: Jones, the scope of section 1982 was extended to priv-
be assumed that Griggs is any more significant for interpreting sections 1981 and 1982
than are cases holding good faith to be a defense under section 1983.
50. 401 U.S. at 429-31.
51. Id. at 432.
52. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (1970).
53. 358 US. 1 (1958).
54. 392 US. 409 (1968). See notes 14-20 supra & accompanying text.
55. 358 U.S. at 14-15.
56. Id. at 15.
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ate sales and rentals of property, but neither defenses nor damages were
treated.57
Griggs, Cooper, and Jones, though relevant to the question of good
faith defenses to discrimination actions generally, do not establish that
intent is not a factor when compensatory damages are sought. The pur-
pose of the civil rights acts as defined by the Supreme Court clearly is to
eradicate discrimination in matters within their scope regardless of
whether there was, or could have been, an intent to violate the law. 8
But this objective could be accomplished by injunctive relief alone when
there is a good faith attempt to comply with the law. Because the Su-
preme Court has not passed on the issue of intent with regard to compen-
satory damages, the question must be considered still unresolved.
B. The Common Law Approach
The development of a theory of remedies and defenses under sections
1981 and 1982 must be derived, to some extent, from common law con-
cepts,59 for reliance on legislative history and the face of these sections
yields minimal results. In developing this statutory theory of remedies
and defenses, tort law in particular appears useful. As noted by Justice
Douglas in Monroe v. Pape:60 "Section 1979 [now section 1983 ] should
be read against the background of tort liability .. 1 Also, in Curtis
57. Because Jones decided for the first time that section 1982 covered private action,
it reasonably could be inferred that the Court did not recognize a good faith defense.
The issue was not raised by defendants, however. The Court expressly sanctioned in-
junctive relief, but declined to pass upon the propriety of compensatory damages in
section 1982 cases. 392 U.S. at 414 & n.14.
58. This principle is supported in the legislative history of Title II of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, indicating that the overriding purpose of Title II is "to remove the daily
affront and humiliation involved in discriminatory denials of access to facilities osten-
s ibly open to the general public." H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1963).
59. Resort to common law is authorized statutorily by 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1970), which
provides that when the laws of the United States "are deficient in the provisions neces-
sary to furnish suitable remedies . . .the common law . . . shall be extended to and
govern the [district] courts in the trial and disposition of the cause .
60. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
61. Id. at 187. This statement has affected significantly the theory governing actions
brought for violations of civil rights acts. See Nahmod, supra note 3 at 6. Although
there is still some disagreement as to the extent to which tort concepts should govern
section 1983 actions, cf. Nahmod, supra note 3 at 11-12, it apparently is settled that
courts must look to tort law for the appropriate basis of liability and remedies in those
actions. See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 556-57 (1967); McCray v. Maryland,
456 F.2d 1, 4-6 (4th Cir. 1972).
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v. Loetber, 2 the Court stated that a damage action under a statute for-
bidding racial discrimination (Tide VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968)
sounds basically in tort. 3
This Note posits two theories by which principles of tort law may be
utilized in the disposition of civil rights actions. Under the "control
theory," a statutory civil rights action often is deemed to have the same
elements as an analogous common law tort, and consequently also is
deemed to share the same defenses and remedies. Under the "guidelines
theory," common law tort precepts, together with federal policy, are con-
sidered by the court in determining applicable remedies and defenses."
1. Background Torts and the Control Theory of Liability and
Defenses Under Sections 1981 and 1982
Application of the control theory is illustrated by Whirl v. Kern,5
in which the court, confronting an action under section 1983,66 implied
that because the elements of that action were synonymous with the ele-
ments of the tort of false imprisonment, defenses to the common law
tort were controlling on the statutory action. 7 Although it appears that
such "background torts" as false imprisonment are found more easily in
actions brought under section 198388 than in actions brought under sec-
62. 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
63. Id. at 195.
64. The premise that section 1983 should be read against the background of tort
liability, see note 61 supra & accompanying text, has resulted in the appearance of both
theories. Compare Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781, 787-88 (5th Cir. 1969) (control theory)
with Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 390-95 (1971) and Carter
v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358, 362-63, 365 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, sub nom.
District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973) (guidelines theory). See Nahmod,
supra note 3, at 11-13.
65. 407 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1969).
66. See note 2 supra.
67. Id. at 790-92; see Nahmod, supra note 3, at 14-15. The importance of identifying
the background tort when the control theory is implemented is illustrated by a
comparison of Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), with Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781
(1969), both of which were brought under section 1983. In Pierson an action was
brought against police officers for false arrest and for violation of section 1983. The
Court held that the defense of good faith, available to police officers at common law
in an action for false arrest, also was available to them in an action under section 1983.
386 U.S. at 557. The plaintiff in Whirl sued for damages for false imprisonment and
for violation of section 1983. The court found Pierson inapposite (since it involved
false arrest rather than false imprisonment) and held that though a good faith defense
existed at common law to the tort of false arrest, no such defense existed to false im-
prisonment. 407 F.2d at 792.
68. A great number of section 1983 violations parallel common law torts. In Monroe v.
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tions 1981 or 1982, there are nevertheless a number of potentially useful
background torts that may be considered during disposition of a suit
brought under either of the latter two sections. Such torts include: inter-
ference with prospective advantage, racial discrimination as a tort of in-
sult and indignity, the common law tort of an innkeeper's refusal of
lodging to a traveler, a prima facie tort, and intentional infliction of
mental distress. Although at first glance these appear to be particularly
useful background torts, a closer analysis reveals problems.
(a) Interference with Prospective Advantage
Interference with prospective advantage initially appears to be an ap-
propriate background tort for civil rights statutory actions because when
one is not allowed to purchase property"u or make a contract for use of
recreational facilities,7° he or she is being denied a prospective advan-
tage. 1 Two elements, however, limit the usefulness of this tort to
control theory application.
First, the tort is generally restricted to commercial situations or inter-
ference with one's business; recovery, therefore, has been denied when
the advantage sought was primarily social.72 There is no common law
right to be admitted to membership in a voluntary association;78 nor will
a court compel such an organization to admit a person who has not been
elected according to its rules and bylaws.1 4 "The general rule is that there
is no legal remedy for exclusion of such an individual from admission
Pape, 365 US. 167 (1961), for instance, such torts as assault, battery, false imprisonment,
intentional infliction of mental distress,. and invasion of privacy probably could have
been utilized as background torts. Nahmod, supra note 3 at 6.
69. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 US. 409 (1968).
70. See Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, Inc, 410 U.S. 431 (1973).
71. Of course, if the advantage is not economic, the tort may not be applicable; see
note 72 infra & accompanying text. When membership in a swimming pool is denied,
the advantage may be one that involves only the pleasure and enjoyment of the
recreational facility. In the Tillman situation, however, the right of first option when
the membership was full would create an economic prospective advantage. It would
be possible for a white who belonged to the pool to sell his house for a considerably
higher price than a black who had been denied membership, because the white member
could assure his purchaser the option for membership. See Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven
Recreation Ass'n, Inc, 451 F.2d 1211, 1223 (4th Cir. 1971) (Butzner, J, dissenting),
adopted in reversal, 410 U.S. 431, 437 (1973).
72. PRossER, THE LAw oF TORTS 1 130, at 950 (4th ed. 1971). Exceptions to this
rule include interference with expected gifts or legacies under a will. Id.
73. Mayer v. Journeymen Stone-Cutters' Ass'n, 47 N.J. Eq. 519, 20 A. 492 (Ch. 1890).
74. Leeds v. Harrison, 7 N.J. Super. 558, 72 A.2d 371 (Ch. Div. 1950). This assumes a
situation not governed by civil rights legislation.
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into a voluntary association, no matter how arbitrary or unjust the ex-
clusion." 75 Of course there is a remedy under section 1981, unless the
association falls within the private club exception. 6 But, because the tort
of interference with prospective social advantage does not exist, when
section 1981 is violated by the denial of membership to a black by an
association organized for social purposes, common law principles cannot
form a basis for determining defenses, liabilities, or remedies.7r
Second, an exclusively malevolent motive is generally a condition
precedent to a finding of interference with prospective advantage; 78
therefore, if the defendant acts partially to protect a legitimate interest, a
claim for interference with prospective advantage will be insufficient. 9
Technically, then, it would follow that a defendant who refused to ad-
mit blacks to his business establishment out of malice and spite and also
because it would hurt his business could use the latter reason as a defense
to damages. Because this rationale does not comport with application -of
the civil rights sections, the tort of interference with prospective advan-
tage is not a proper background tort for utilization of the control
theory.so
75. Trautwein v. Harbourt, 40 N.J. Super. 247, -, 123 A.2d 30, 37 (Super. Cr. App.
Div. 1956).
76. 42 U.S.C. 2000a(e) (1970). See notes 17-19 supra & accompanying text.
77. Courts have been reluctant to extend the tort "to speculative prospects outside
the field of business relations... ." 1 F. HARM & F. JAm-S, JaL, Tim LAw oF Toms
§ 6.11, at 512 (1956). Interference with prospective advantage nonetheless can serve
as a background tort under the control theory when there is a sufficient showing of
business experience from which it is possible to estimate with some certainty the value
of what has been lost and the likelihood of the plaintiff's having received that value
but for the defendant's interference. PaossER, supra note 72, § 130, at 950.
78. See PhossEm, supra note 72, § 130, at 953.
79. Dean Prosser reaches the conclusion that:
Most of the decisions have turned upon the defendant's motive or pur-
pose.... [Tlhe defendant will be held liable if the reason underlying his
interference is purely a malevolent one, and a desire to do harm to the
plaintiff for its own sake. On the other hand, some element of ill will is
seldom absent from intentional interference; and if the defendant has a
legitimate interest to protect, the addition of a spite motive usually is not
regarded as sufficient to result in liability.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
80. A final argument against the utility of interference with prospective advantage of
perhaps less significance is that its common law application generally involves a third
party's interference with the relationship between two other parties. See, e.g., Boggs v.
Duncan-Schell Furniture Co, 163 Iowa 106, 143 N.W. 482 (1913) (malicious attempt
to attract plaintiff's customers by price-cutting); Graham v. St. Charles St. R. Co, 47
La. Ann. 214, 16 So. 806 (1895) (threatening to fire employees if they traded at plain-
tiffs store); Willner v. Silverman, 109 Md. 341, 71 A. 962 (1909) (attempting to impede
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Finally, with respect to an action against officers of a corporation for
racial discrimination, the tort of interference with prospective advantage
is inapplicable. The tort developed from the tort of interference
with contract, and its elemen" closely parallel those of the earlier ac-
tion.8 ' Significantly, directors and corporate officers generally are not
liable to any third party who has contracted with the corporation for in-
ducing the corporation to breach its contract with the third party.s2 This
principle applies even when the action includes a claim for damages for
humiliation, embarrassment, loss of reputation, or loss of credit rating.83
Thus, it would follow that they are not liable for inducing their corpora-
tion to interfere with a third party's prospective advantage.
(b) Racial Discrimination as a Tort of Insult and Indignity
A nascent tort that can be characterized as one of insult and indignity
resulting from racial discrimination has potential applicability under the
control theory. In Rogers v. Loether, 4 the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit suggested that a basis for the emergence of such a tort
could be found in the analysis of Professors Gregory and Kalven. 5
Gregory and Kalven, however, do riot assert that such a tort exists, but
rather pose the question whether the act of racial discrimination may be
plaintiff's employment by blacklisting him with a trade association); Tuttle v. Buck,
107 Minn. 145, 119 N.W. 946 (1909) (establishing a barber shop for the sole purpose
of injuring plaintiff by enticing away his customers); Huskie v. Griffin, 75 N.H. 345,
74 A. 595 (1909) (former employer discouraging prospective employer from hiring
plaintiff); Jersey City Printing Co. v. Cassidy, 63 N.J. Eq. 759, 53 A. 230 (Ch. 1902)
(striking workers coercing prospective employees to refrain from taking employment
with plaintiff); Erdman v. Mitchell, 207 Pa. 79, 56 A. 327 (1903) (members of unin-
corporated union attempting to deprive members of plaintiff incorporated union of
work on same job by means of strikes and threats).
Violations of section 1981 or 1982 commonly are instances of one party refusing to
contract with another, except in the corporate context when a black seeks to make a
contract with a corporation and a third party, the corporate director, interferes. This
latter situation is discussed at note 82 infra & accompanying text.
81. See PaossER, supra note 72, 5 130, at 949; Basak, Principles of Liability for Inter-
ference 'with Trade, Profession or Calling (pts. 1-3), 27 L.Q. REv. 290, 399 (1911), 28
L.Q. Rrv. 52 (1912).
82. H. HENN, LAW OF CORtORAnoNs § 235, at 457 (2d ed. 1970).
83. See, e.g., Wampler v. Palmerton, 250 Ore. 65, 439 P.2d 601 (1968) (no liability
if officers act in good faith to advance interest of corporation).
84. 467 F.2d 1110 (7th Cir. 1972), aff'd sub norn., Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189
(1974).
85. C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 960-67 (2d ed. 1969),
cited in 467 F.2d 1117 n. 23. See also Eslinger v. Thomas, 476 F.2d 225, 229 (4th Cir.
1973) (suggesting that sex discrimination is a new tort).
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regarded as an independent "dignitary"' tort.8s Confronting a similar
question with respect to sex discrimination, the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit stated in Esliner v. Thomas87 that "[a] federal cause of
action based on sex-discrimination has no deep roots; rather, it emerges
from recent enlightened approaches to what constitutes equal protection
of the laws under the fourteenth amendment." SS The present status of
racial discrimination probably will be treated similarly, for case law has
not yet recognized such discrimination to be an independent tort.' It
would seem, though, that racial discrimination at least may be considered
a component of some other tort, such as intentional infliction of mental
distress. In summary, however, application of the control theory with
respect to the "dignitary" tort of racial discrimination must await future
recognition that such a tort exists.
(c) The Innkeeper's Tort
In Rogers v. Loether,10 a third possibility suggested for a proper back-
ground tort was that of an innkeeper's refusing lodging to a traveler.91
Such a tort clearly would be appropriate for violations of sections 1981
and 1982 when a black is refused food, lodging,92 or transportation by
a common carrier.93 The common law rationale and origin of the inn-
keeper's tort, however, do not justify its expansion. The tort was limited
86. "The question we wish to pose . . . is whether under the logic of the common
law development of a law of insult and indignity, racial discrimination might be treated
as a dignitary tort." GpGoRY & KALVEN, supra note 85, at 961.
87. 476 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1973).
88. Id. at 229.
89. The Restatement of Torts has taken the position that, with certain exceptions,
intentionally or unintentionally harming another by refusing to enter into a business
relation with him is not actionable. REsTATEMENT OF TORTS § 762 (1939). Refusal based
on racial discrimination presumably would fall within this rule.
Racial discrimination as a tort might be developed from the tort of wrongful depriva-
tion of the right to vote, see REsTATEmENT OF TORTS § 865 (1939), a tort that has arisen
often from instances of racial discrimination. See, e.g., Louisiana v. United States, 380
U.S. 145 (1965). In this context it should be noted that a mistake of fact or law is a
valid defense. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 865, comment a (1939). But it is clear that
the essence of the action remains the deprivation of the right, not the discrimination
per se.
90. 467 F.2d 1110 (7th Cir. 1972), aff'd sub nom., Curds v. Loether 415 U.S. 189
(1974).
91. Id. at 1117.
92. See generally Thomas v. Pick Hotels Corp., 224 F.2d 664 (10th Cir. 1955).
93. Cf. Chiles v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 125 Ky. 229, 101 S.W. 386 (1907); West
Chester & Phila. R.R. v. Miles, 55 Pa. 209 (1967).
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strictly to public callings or to circumstances in which the defendant re-
fused to provide an essential service over which he had a monopoly. 4 To
expand the tort beyond "common callings" or essential services controlled
by monopolies would strip the tort of an essential limitation engen-
dered by its rationale. This position is supported by the Restatement
of Torts 5 and by case law. 6 Thus, the utility of the innkeeper's tort as
a background tort for purposes of sections 1981 and 1982 is extremely
limited.
(d) The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine
The prima facie tort doctrine can be traced to the English case of
Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co.,9 7 in which it was
stated: "now intentionally to do that which is calculated in the ordinary
course of events to damage, and which does, in fact, damage another in
that person's property or trade, is actionable if done without just cause
94. The singular context that impelled the development of the innkeeper's tort illus-
trates the narrowness of its applicability.
The innkeeper is in a common calling under severe penalty if he does not
serve all that apply, while the ordinary shopkeeper is in a private calling
free to refuse to sell if he is so minded. The surrounding circumstances
must again explain the origin of this unusual law. When the weary traveller
reaches the wayside inn in the gathering dusk, if the host turn him away
what shall he do? Go on to the next inn? It is miles away, and the roads
are infested with robbers. The traveller would be at the mercy of the
innkeeper, who might practise upon him any extortion, for the guest would
submit to anything almost, rather than be put out into the night. Truly a
special law is required to meet this situation, for the traveller is so in the
hands of the innkeeper that only an affirmative law can protect him. But
the case of a customer in a town is altogether different. There are shops in
plenty and he has time to choose. If he is charged an exorbitant price by
one shopkeeper, all that he need do is leave that shop and go on to the
next. No special law is required to meet this situation ....
Wyman, The Law of the Public Callings as a Solution of the Trust Problem, 17 HAtv.
L. REv. 156, 159 (1904).
95. RESrATEMENr oF ToaRs § 866, comment a (1939). The comment indicates that
this tort applies only to public utilities, which are under a common law duty to furnish
reasonable facilities to all who apply. It further states that whether a similar rule applies
to places of amusement or other public places depends entirely upon statutes and their
interpretations.
96. See, e.g., Brown v. J. H. Bell Co, 146 Iowa 89, 123 N.W. 231 (1909). This case
involved a statute that forbade racial discrimination not only in inns, but also in restau-
rants, barbershops, bathhouses, theaters, and other places of amusement. The court
noted that there was no such offense at common law and that the liabilities and remedies
were creatures of statute. Id. at -, 123 N.W. at 233.
97. 23 Q.BD. 598 (1889), a)f'd, [18921 A.C. 25.
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or excuse." 9s The doctrine was introduced and developed in the United
States by 99 Mr. Justice Holmes; in Aikens v. Wisconsi °° Holmes stated
that, "prima fade, the intentional infliction of temporal damage is a cause
of action, which, as a matter of substantive law, whatever may be the
form of pleading, requires a justification if the defendant is to escape." 101
The breadth of the pronouncements from which the doctrine evolved
and its use when the plaintiff's cause of action did not fit traditional tort
categories10 2 makes the prima facie tort potentially suitable as a back-
ground tort to every violation of section 1981 or 1982.
Notably, the intent element of the prima facie tort, as formulated in
Mogul Steamship, entailed merely intent to do the act complained of,
rather than intent to cause damage.0 3 Moreover, though there is strong
authority for the view that a prima facie tort now requires a malicious
intent, 04 this view is not accepted universally,0 5 and in looking to com-
mon law roots, a court basing liability on the prima facie tort doctrine
could find that wrongful or malicious intent is not necessary.
The prima facie tort doctrine as a background tort, however, is incon-
sistent with the rationale underlying the control theory - that common
law concepts should control liabilities and remedies under sections 1981
and 1982. To make out a prima facie tort, the harm inflicted must be un-
98. 23 Q.B.D. at 613. See generally Forkosch, An Analysis of the "Prima Face Tort"
Cause of Action, 42 CoRNs L.Q. 465, (1957); Note, The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine,
52 COLUM. L. REv. 503 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Prima Facie Tort].
99. Prima Facie Tort, supra note 98, at 504.
100. 195 US. 194 (1904). Other cases in which Holmes discussed the prima facie tort
doctrine are: Moran v. Dunphy, 177 Mass. 485, 59 N.E. 125 (1901); Plant v. Woods,
176 Mass. 492, 57 N.E. 1011 (1900) (dissenting opinion); Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167
Mass. 92, 44 N.E. 1077 (1896) (dissenting opinion).
101. 195 U.S. at 204 (1904).
102. Prima Fade Tort, supra note 98, at 512.
103. See id. at 505.
104. This view apparently has its origins in Justice Holmes' language in American
Bank & Trust Co. v. Federal Res. Bank, 256 US. 350, 358 (1921) in which he spoke of
"disinterested malevolence." This phrase was equated with "intentional malicious injury
to another" in Morrison v. National Bdcstng. Co., 24 App. Div. 2d 284, -, 266 N.YS2d
406, 409 (1965). See also Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 204-06 (1904). In par-
ticular, New York courts have found wrongful or malicious intent a condition prece-
dent to a finding of the prima facie tort. See Morrison v. National Bdcstng. Co., 24
App. Div. 2d 284, 266 N.Y.S.2d 406 (1965). Furthermore, the New York rule apparently
holds that a prima facie tort does not exist unless the "defendant's sole motive [is] to
injure the plaintiff"; acting from mixed motives is insufficient, Glenn v. Advertising
Pubs, Inc, 251 F. Supp. 889, 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). See generally. Note, Recent Develop-
ments in the New York Law of Prima Facie Tort, 32 ST. Jom's L. REv. 282 (1958).
105. Prima Fade Tort, supra note 98, at 507.
1976]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
justifiable, and "(w) hat amounts to legal justification or excuse depends
upon 'principles of policy.' "'o This element, then, turns not upon com-
mon law precedents, but upon considerations of public policy.10 7 It has
been suggested that this characteristic of the doctrine is its greatest con-
tribution, making liability dependent on a recognition of the relevant so-
cial and private interests.08 As previously noted, however, the analysis
undertaken in this discussion assumes that the common law approach
and the public policy approach are separate and distinct.?1 9 The essential
role of public policy in the prima facie tort doctrine makes it inapposite
to the common law approach. But the fact that the doctrine appears to
comprehend section 1981 and 1982 violations so well, indicates the
strength of the policy approach as an analytical foundation.
(e) Intentional Infliction of Mental Distress
A final tort that has played a significant role in racial discrimination
cases is intentional infliction of mental distress." 0 This tort requires
either an intent to inflict mental distress, or if there is no actual intent,
substantial certainty that such distress will result from the defendant's
action."' Arguably, it is reasonable to presume that actual intent to in-
flict mental distress exists when one discriminates on the basis of race,
as mental distress is an ordinary result of discrimination. Other elements
of the tort, however, will not be present in many section 1981 and 1982
violations. The conduct must be' extreme and outrageous, and the dis-
tress caused must be very serious and severe."12 Although racial discrimi-
106. House of Materials, Inc. v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 298 F.2d 867, 872 (2d Cir.
1962).
107. Id.; Green v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 24 F.2d 378, 382 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
278 U.S. 602 (1928).
108. Prima Facie Tort, supra note 98, at 513. See also Forkosch, An Analysis of the
"Prima Facie Tort" Cause of Action, 42 CORNELL L.Q. 465 (1957): "[Tihe law will
weigh one policy against the other and apply that which is more conducive to the
public weal." Id. at 472.
109. See notes 35-37 supra & accompanying text.
110. The district court in Tillman II noted that mental distress in the sense of humilia-
tion or embarrassment was a compensable injury in the case at bar. 367 F. Supp. at 864.
111. PROSSER, supra note 72, § 12, at 60.
112. Dean Prosser states: "So far as it is possible to generalize from the cases, the
rule which seems to have emerged is that there is liability for conduct exceeding all
bounds usually tolerated by decent society, of a nature which is especially calculated
to cause, and does cause, mental distress of a very severe kind." PROSSER § 12, at 56. He
further suggests that unless the conduct is so unusually extreme and outrageous so as
to create a presumption of severe mental distress, the mental distress must be mani-
fested in physical symptoms before recovery is allowed. Id. § 12, at 59-60.
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nation cases have relaxed the traditionally rigid adherences to these
elements," 3 it seems apparent that a polite letter falsely informing a black
that there are no vacancies in a swimming pool association still would
fail to meet such a relaxed application of the tort.114
Moreover, with respect to racial discrimination cases, a relaxed applica-
tion of the mental distress tort would fail to result in a successful applica-
tion of the control doctrine for two reasons. First, the apparently less
egregious conduct and distress required might be deemed a difference in
kind but not of degree, creating a related, yet fundamentally different
tort than that of intentional infliction of mental distress. This new tort
would be one of insult and indignity resulting from racial discrimination,
which consequently could not control liabilities and defenses under sec-
tions 1981 and 1982 because it has no common law roots. Second, if a
new tort is deemed not to exist, the resultant tort would be intentional
infliction of mental distress, with common law standards modified to
meet the exigencies of racial discrimination. As under the prima facie
tort doctrine, this would place liability on a public policy footing.
2. The Guidelines Theory of Liability and Defenses Under
Sections 1.981 and 1.982
If, as some courts have maintained, liabilities and defenses under sec-
tions 1981 and 1982 are to be controlled by common law tort concepts,
there must be some background torts that will apply generally to the
factual situations upon which actions brought under those statutes are
based. The foregoing examination has demonstrated that torts deeply
113. See Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrim. v. Franzaroli, 357 Mass. 112, 256
N.E.2d 311 (1970), noted in Note, Torts-Mental Distress Damages for Racial Discrimina-
tion, 49 N.C.. Rxv. 221, 228 (1970). A discussion of discrimination cases allowing
recovery when something less than the common law standards was shown may be found
in Gray v. Serruto Builders, Inc., 110 N.J. Super. 297, -, 265 A.2d 404, 414-15 (1970).
114. It has been noted that
[Tihe requirements for recovery for intentional infliction of mental distress
are quite rigid .... The conduct causing the injury must be such as a
reasonable man would consider "outrageous." It is doubtful that a single
covert act of discrimination unaccompanied by aggravating conduct would
be sufficient to meet the "outrageous" or the "severe emotional harm" test.
Note, Torts-Mental Distress Damages for Racial Discrimination, 49 N.CL. REv. 221,
224 (1970) (footnotes omitted).
Further, racial discrimination usually "is conduct that does not arouse the spirit to
the extent of a headache, upset stomach, fainting spell or other physical result of either
momentary or lasting duration." Duda, Damages for Mental Suffering in Discrimination
Cases, 15 CLEv.-MAR. L. REv. 1, 10 (1966).
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rooted in the common law rarely are sufficiently comparable to racial
discrimination to warrant imposing their elements of liability and de-
fenses upon statutory actions. It is submitted that Justice Douglas's re-
mark that statutory violations must be read against a common law tort
background does not require courts to make tort concepts controlling on
sections 1981 and 1982. Such an approach entails either the distortion
beyond recognition of established tort doctrines, or the creation of new
torts, which defeats the underlying purpose of the common law control
theory. The use of common law tort concepts as guidelines for the de-
termination of liabilities and defenses under sections 1981 and 1982, in
light of the public policy considerations involved, is a more valid ap-
proach. There are three areas of general tort law in which guidelines for
section 1981 and 1982 actions might be sought. Violations of those sec-
tions often will involve issues of intent, mistakes of law, and fault.
(a) Intent
Stating that the defendants acted voluntarily and intentionally, the
court in Tillman II noted that such action ordinarily is sufficient to sup-
port tort liability when the interests of another are invaded in a manner
not sanctioned by the law."" Tort liability, noted the court, is based not
on an intent to violate the applicable statute, but rather, on an intent to
discriminate in a manner forbidden by the statute, whether or not the
defendant knows that such discrimination is unlawful. Although this is
the predominant concept of intent in tort law, it is not exclusive. For
example, as previously noted, interference with prospective advantage
requires not only intent to do the act that injures the plaintiff, but also
a malicious intent to do it for the sole purpose of injuring the plaintiff."
The same is true of the torts of deceit and malicious prosecution." 7 Thus,
the proper concept of intent for section 1981 and 1982 violations need
not be that adopted by Tillman 11, and if malicious intent is required
before recovery for damages is allowed, a good faith effort to comply
with the law should be a valid defense to such relief." 8
115. 517 F.2d at 1143, citing PaossEa, supra note 72, § 8.
116. See note 78 supra & accompanying text.
117. 8 W. HoLswoRTH, A HIsToRY OF E.NGISH LAW 447-48 (1926).
118. Stated the court in Tillman 1I: "Only when wrongful intent is an element of a
tort can a director who acted innocently escape liability." 517 F.2d at 1144. The court
was acting on the theory that tort law should control sections 1981 and 1982: the
difficulties inherent in that doctrine have been discussed. But if the concept of malicious
intent as it appears in tort law is a proper guideline to govern sections 1981 and 1982,
the court's observation would require a different result than that reached.
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(b) Mistake of Law
The general rule that mistake of law is no defense to a tort action 1 9
is based primarily on the rationale that, as between two innocent parties,
the one causing the injury should bear the loss.1 °0 A mistake is privileged,
however, when necessity dictates that the defendant act quickly to pro-
tect a known right.Y2' This limitation suggests that one primary purpose
of the general rule is to encourage the exercise of care when there is time
to ascertain the true situation. The exercise of due diligence subserves this
rationale because it necessarily involves a careful examination of the
relevant circumstances. Due diligence in attempting to ascertain the law
therefore should be allowed as a defense.
Consequently, a mistake of law defense is a viable alternative in section
1981 and 1982 actions. Moreover, with respect to such actions, due dili-
gence generally is provable, as in Tillman II, in which there was reliance
upon counsel and a demonstrable difficulty in determining the scope of
the statute.'22 The ease with which due diligence may be determined in
civil rights actions also quells the traditional objection to the due dili-
gence defense, born from ancient trespass cases, that such diligence is
difficult to prove. 23 Thus, it cannot be said that the general tort rule with
respect to mistake of law need be applied to section 1981 and 1982 vio-
lations.
119. See Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 517 F.2d 1141, 1143 (4th Cir.
1975), citing PROSSER, supra note 72, §§ 8, 17.
120. PaossER, supra note 72, § 17, at 99. For a critical analysis of this rationale, see
Whittier, Mistake in the Law of Torts, 15 HARv. L. REv. 335 (1902). It is not clear
whether a non-negligent mistake exonerates one of civil liability. See Smith, Tort and
Absolute Liability-Suggested Changes in Classification, 30 HARV. L. Rav. 319, 327 (1917).
The rule governing mistake of law as a defense developed from cases of trespass to
land. See 0. HoLMEs, Tim COMMOm LAW 96-100 (1881). An argument has been made
that "[tihese particular cases do not decide whether mistakes on other subjects do, or
do not, constitute a defense to actions for damage to property or to the person." Smith,
supra, at 327. One author, noting the established status of the doctrine, calls it "an
anomaly" and seeks to restrict its application since "[iun many cases of injuries to the
person . .. the principle is not applied." Whittier, supra, at 346-47. The rule has not
been applied invariably in cases involving property rights. See Sovern v. Yoran, 16
Ore. 269, 20 P. 100 (1888) (defendant, mistaken as to the legal meaning of "lost" prop-
erty, excused from liability in trover).
121. Paossan, supra note 72, § 17, at 100.
122. Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 517 F.2d 1141, 1151 (4th Cir. 1975)
(Boreman, J, dissenting).
123. See HoLMEs, supra note 120, at 99.
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(c) Lack of Fault
A third common law approach involves the element of moral fault
or culpability as a requisite to liability in tort law. The dissent in Tillman
Il found the lack of such fault to be determinative of the directors' lia-
bility, 24 but fault as it has developed in tort law does not provide a firm
basis for that position. The dissent relied on Taylor v. City of Cin-
cinnati,125 a case involving strict liability,12 6 to support its proposition that
culpability is a prerequisite to tort liability. Taylor suggested four cate-
gories of actions incurring tort liability:
(1) Culpable and intentional acts resulting in harm; (2) acts in-
volving culpable and unlawful conduct causing unintentional harm;
(3) nonculpable acts or conduct resulting in accidental harm for
which, because of the hazards involved, the law imposes strict or
absolute liability notwithstanding the absence of fault; and (4)
culpable acts of inadvertance involving unreasonable risks of
harm.127
The second type of act correlates most closely with the Tillnan Il situa-
tion, and liability premised on this analysis turns on the definition of
"culpable conduct."
Apparently assuming that this term meant moral guilt, the dissent in
Tillnan H concluded that no liability could be imposed upon the direc-
tors, but fault or culpability in tort law generally has meant the violation of
some legal standard of conduct without regard for the innocent intent of
the actor.128 If sections 1981 and 1982 (as judicially interpreted) com-
port with this standard, the acts of the directors in Tillman I did con-
stitute "culpable conduct." Arguably, however, until the Supreme
Court's decision in Tillnan 1, no legal standard existed that the directors
reasonably could have been charged with violating. Thus, the result in
Tillnan 11 can be read only as an imposition of strict liability upon the
directors, an extension of that doctrine not justifiable in light of its nar-
row rationale. 2 ' Therefore, if fault or culpability in the tort sense is to
124. 517 F.2d at 1150.
125. 143 Ohio St. 426, 55 N.E.2d 724 (1944).
126. It should be noted that illegal discrimination does not reflect strict liability con-
cepts because the act of discrimination itself is wrongful: liability is not imposed solely
on the basis of any harmful consequences. Cf. PROSSER, supra note 72, § 75, at 494-95.
127. 143 Ohio St. at -- , 55 N.E.2d at 727.
128. See PROSSER, supra note 72, § 75, at 493.
129. Strict liability usually has been limited to situations involving substantial risk of
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be used as a basis for tort liability under sections 1981 and 1982, it should
require the existence of an ascertainable standard of conduct before such
liability can be imposed. 13
C. The Public Policy Approach
Public policy is a concept that, though not subject to precise defini-
tion,13 should be accorded a significant role in determining defenses to
damage actions under sections 1981 and 1982.1S2 There are several con-
siderations that are relevant to defenses generally, and to defenses of cor-
porate directors in particular.
First, an element of unfairness exists in requiring a defendant to pay
damages for violating a law that he could not have known he was violat-
personal injury and compelling public policy considerations. See generally PRossER,
supra note 72, §§ 75-81, 98.
130. This position is consistent with decisions under section 1983 that make good faith
coupled with reasonable grounds to believe that one is acting within the law sufficient
to preclude liability for damages. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967); Eslinger v.
Thomas, 476 F.2d 225, 229 (4th Cir. 1973).
Another common law concept worthy of comment involves the due diligence defense
as it is utilized in the corporate context. The directors in Tillman 11 argued that because
they had exercised due diligence in attempting to ascertain whether the racial policy
they enacted was illegal, common law principles of corporate law entitled them to
raise a due diligence defense. 517 F.2d at 1143. The majority rejected this position by
holding that since the due diligence defense is derived from negligence law, id. at 1144,
it could not be used by directors who intentionally committed torts against third
persons. Id. See Comment, Trends in Corporate Director Liability, 17 S.D.L. REv. 468,
470-71 (1972). In a stockholders' derivative suit, the defendant directors may use a due
diligence defense when they have attempted to ascertain the law bur, as a result of
misapplication, commit an intentional act which causes injury to the corporation. See
Spirt v. Bechtel, 232 F.2d 241, 246-47 (2d Cir. 1956) and Gilbert v. Burnside, 216
N.Y.S.2d 430, 13 A.D.2d 982 (App. Div. 1961) aff'd, 11 N.Y.2d 960, 183 N.E.2d 235,
229 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1962), cited in Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 517 F.2d
1141, 1150 (1975) (Boreman, J., dissenting).
131. See, e.g., First Trust & Say. Bank v. Powers, 393 I11. 97, 102, 65 N.E.2d 377, 380
(1946). Justice Holmes, dissenting in Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N.E. 1077
(1896), stated that "[piropositions as to public policy rarely are unanimously accepted,
and still more rarely, if ever, are capable of unanswerable proof." Id. at 106, 44 N.E. at
1080.
132. Invocation of public policy is appropriate when there are legitimate conflicting
interests. But see O'Callaghan v. Waller & Beckwith Realty Co., 15 1ll.2d 436, 155
N.E.2d 545 (1958). Public policy has been used in conjunction with the background-
tort control theory in examination of defenses to section 1983 actions. See, e.g., Whirl
v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781, 790-92 (5th Cir. 1969). The court in Tillman 11 noted that the
due diligence defense raised to the section 1981 and 1982 action was not warranted by
precedent or policy, 517 F.2d at 1145-46, but no policy considerations in support of this
assertion were discussed.
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ing'8 In the Tillman litigation, this unfairness proceeded from the im-
position of liability upon corporate directors based upon a reading of the
law that had been rejected by both the district court and the court -of
appeals before being accepted by the Supreme Court. Case law recogniz-
ing that state officers should not be charged with a duty to anticipate
shifts in constitutional doctrine134 raises serious questions as to the pro-
priety of holding corporate directors to a standard of legal acumen ex-
ceeding that of the federal judiciary,3 5 and making them answerable in
damages if they fail to meet that standard.
Second, the establishment of stringent standards that expose con-
scientious corporate directors to substantial liability may make it ex-
tremely difficult for corporations to induce highly qualified people to
serve in that capacity.3 This effect would negate the generally accepted
public policy favoring the installation of competent outsiders on the
boards of both commercial and noncommercial organizations.
Third, because a person wronged should be compensated, and an in-
nocent party should not be subjected to liability,13 7 there would appear
to be a ready balance struck in the corporate context by imposing lia-
bility for damages upon the corporation alone. No compelling interest
in extending liability to innocent directors exists in these cases38 be-
cause the injured plaintiffs are compensated fully, and injunctive relief
is sufficient to insure compliance with the law by the directors.
Finally, there is a certain inequity in the disparate treatment that under
the Tillman II rationale would be accorded public officials as opposed
to private corporate officers; public officials who violate civil rights sta-
133. One commentator has argued that fundamental principles of justice reject the
retroactive application of a new rule, particularly if the law was unclear prior to the
rule. L FuLLmt, Tan MoaAury oF LAW 33-94 (1964).
134. See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967) (policeman); Eslinger v.
Thomas, 476 F.2d 225, 229 (4th Cir. 1973) (clerk of the legislature); Westberry v.
Fisher, 309 F. Supp. 12, 17-18 (D. Me. 1970) (commissioner of health and welfare).
135. See Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 517 F.2d 1141, 1151 (4th Cir.
1975) (Boreman, J., dissenting).
136. See Note, The Proper Standard of Fault for Imposing Personal Liability on
Corporate Directors for False or Misleading Statements in Proxy Solicitations Under
Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 14a-9, 34 Omno Sr.
L.J. 670, 685-86 (1973); Comment, Trends in Corporate Director Liability, 17 S.D.L.
REv. 468 (1972). See Wall Street Journal, Mar. 13, 1969, at 1, col. 6.
137. See Whittier, supra note 120, at 335.
138. This policy consideration is reflected in the federal enforcement of antitrust
laws. See Note, Liability of Directors to Shareholders for Negligence Under American
Law and Their Indemnification, 16 McGIL L.J. 323, 372 (1970).
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tutes may avail themselves of a good faith defense to avoid liability for
damages. 39 A comparison of the potential liability to which directors of
public and private schools maintaining affirmative action programs are
exposed illustrates the arbitrary nature of the doctrine denying a good
faith defense in the private sector. If the affirmative action program of
the public school is determined to be unlawfully discriminatory under
section 1981,140 the directors of the school could raise a good faith de-
fense and thereby be immune from personal liability. Under the Tilima
Ii rationale, the directors of the private institution, confronted with a like
finding, would be compelled to answer individually in damages. Both
public and private schools serve functions similarly benefitting the public.
The rationale for immunity of public officials -to allow discretion in
the performance of duties without fear of personal liability and to en-
courage qualified individuals to serve in a public capacity 141- appears
equally applicable to the private school situation. It therefore is submitted
that the result of Tilhman 11 is rejected by persuasive policy considera-
tions.
CONCLUSION
The crucial question presented in actions brought under sections 1981
and 1982 is not whether there are absolute defenses to violations of those
statutes, but whether there should be defenses to claims for damages.
This problem has been approached in terms of the legislative history
and judicial interpretations of civil rights legislation, the tort concepts
that have been read into discrimination actions, and the public policy
considerations underlying damages as an appropriate remedy for viola-
tion of civil rights statutes. Each approach has produced factors that
should enter into any decision to award damages for discrimination.
Courts should be aware that the civil rights acts, though directed at the
consequences of discrimination, do not contemplate damages asinvariably
necessary to the effectuation of that purpose. Further, though discrimina-
tion suits do have some of the characteristics of tort actions, a blind ad-
herence to tort doctrine is an unworkable and arbitrary method of
139. See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 US. 232 (1974); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547,
555-57 (1967); Eslinger v. Thomas, 476 F.d 225, 228-29 (4th Cir. 1973); Kirstein v.
Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 309 F. Supp. 184, 189 (ED. Va. 1970).
140. Cf. Defunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973), vacated as moot,
416 U.S. 312 (1974).
141. See Kirstein v. Rector & Visitors of tniv. of Va., 309 F. Supp. 184, 188-89
(E.D. Va. 1970).
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establishing the nature of discrimination actions. Finally, several policy
considerations support a conservative approach to awarding damages
when the law is unclear. Specifically, when corporate directors have
acted in good faith and with due diligence, it is suggested that the award
of damages against the corporation is sufficient; by holding, in Tillman
I, that the directors of the corporation were individually liable, the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit did not balance properly the
factors underlying the rationale of civil rights legislation.
